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Abstract—Case records on identified victims of human trafficking are highly sensitive, yet the ability to share such data is critical
to evidence-based practice and policy development across government, business, and civil society. We propose new methods to
anonymize, publish, and explore data on identified victims of trafficking, implemented as a single pipeline producing three data artifacts:
(1) synthetic microdata modelled on sensitive case records and released in their place, mitigating the privacy risk that traffickers might
link distinctive combinations of attributes in published records to known victims; (2) aggregate data summarizing the precomputed
frequencies of all short attribute combinations, mitigating the utility risk that synthetic data might misrepresent statistics needed for
official reporting; and (3) visual analytics interfaces for parallel exploration and evaluation of synthetic data representations and sensitive
data aggregates, mitigating the accessibility risk that privacy mechanisms or analysis tools might not be understandable or usable
by all stakeholders. Central to our mitigation of these risks is the notion of k-synthetic data, which we generate through a distributed
machine learning pipeline. k-synthetic data preserves privacy by ensuring that longer combinations of attributes are not rare in the
sensitive dataset and thus potentially identifying; it preserves utility by ensuring that shorter combinations of attributes are both present
and frequent in the sensitive dataset; and it improves accessibility by being easy to explain and apply. We present our work as a design
study motivated by the goal of creating a new privacy-preserving data platform for the Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC),
transforming how the world’s largest database of identified victims is made available for global collaboration against human trafficking.
Index Terms—Privacy-enhancing technology, data anonymization, data access, synthetic data, visual analytics, human trafficking
1 INTRODUCTION
Human trafficking is a complex crime with a foothold in every country.
While the available data are sparse and there is no global estimate of
overall prevalence, ILO, IOM, and the Walk Free Foundation estimated
that the related crimes of forced labor and forced marriage had as many
as 40 million global victims in 2016 [28]. Much effort has been invested
in the direct, front-line identification and investigation of individual
cases [15], with notable tools including TellFinder [26], DIG [30], and
Traffic Jam [35] for linking and querying online ads for commercial sex,
Freedom Signal [49] for posting decoy sex ads and deterrence chatbots,
and Spotlight [59] for supporting end-to-end juvenile sex trafficking
investigations. However, the tools available to law enforcement and the
support available to the trafficking survivors (e.g., housing, counseling,
and medical care) all depend on evidence-based resource allocation,
which in turn depends on the ability of diverse stakeholders to access,
analyze, and make decisions based on whatever data are available.
The 2019 Trafficking in Persons report [62] describes several chal-
lenges to building centralized datasets that facilitate collaboration be-
tween governments and the counter-trafficking community. These
include the need for trauma-informed data collection as well as appro-
priate data standardization and anonymization to protect the vulnerable
individuals represented in published datasets. This report calls out the
Counter Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC) [10] as a benchmark
initiative in the collection, management, and dissemination of human
trafficking case data. CTDC, launched in 2017, combines deidentified
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victim case records from the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), Polaris, Liberty Shared, and others to create the world’s largest
database on the victims of human trafficking.
In this paper, we report on our design of a new data platform that
enables broader access to rich data on tens of thousands of trafficking
cases while embodying a new class of victim-centered privacy mecha-
nisms (Figure 1). This design process, run as a Tech Against Trafficking
(TAT) [6] Accelerator workstream, paired the IOM team that maintain
the CTDC platform with volunteers from TAT member companies to
tackle the key challenges of data anonymization, access, and analysis.
We structure the paper using the stages of design study methodol-
ogy [50]. First, we present the literature review that we used to LEARN
about privacy-preserving technologies, before describing the acceler-
ator program and launch event used to WINNOW potential directions,
CAST project stakeholders in the broader system of counter-trafficking
activity, and DISCOVER the existing practices by which data on victims
of trafficking are collected, integrated, protected, and released. We then
describe the DESIGN and IMPLEMENT stages of our process and how
they led to a new candidate data platform for CTDC. Finally, we outline
current results on the CTDC Global Dataset and plans to DEPLOY the
revised platform via the CTDC website, before we REFLECT on the
limitations, implications, and future directions of the work.
2 LEARN: PRIVACY CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGIES
Data protection laws such as the EU General Data Protection Reg-
ulation of 2016 (GDPR) [22] offer legal definitions of privacy that
can inform the design of privacy-preserving technologies. The GDPR
differentiates three levels of personal data covered by the regulation:
identified data, identifiable data, and deidentified data. All of these
are forms of microdata in which each record corresponds to a “natural
person”. In contrast, aggregate data is not considered personal and is
not covered by the regulation. Article 11 of the GDPR defines data as
deidentified when “the controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in
a position to identify the data subject”. Importantly, this does not cover
privacy risks from others (i.e., attackers) using their own knowledge
and methods to reidentify individuals within deidentified data. Three
attacker risk models are the prosecutor risk from an attacker aiming to
reidentify a specific individual in the dataset, the journalist risk from
an attacker aiming to reidentify any individual, and the marketer risk
from an attacker aiming to reidentify all individuals [44].
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Fig. 1. Privacy-preserving user interface to “synthetic microdata” in which individual records do not represent actual people, but collectively preserve
the structure and statistics of an underlying sensitive dataset. Illustrations show how interactive data analysis proceeds in Power BI [37]:
(a) Interface template for privacy-preserving analysis of synthetic microdata, supported by aggregate data derived from the same sensitive dataset.
(b) Template customized by pipeline to create a privacy-preserving interface to the sensitive data (CTDC Global Dataset on victims of trafficking).
(c) Visual showing a synthetic data attribute (Gender) and counts of records matching each of its values (40,110 Female; 14,338 Male).
(d) Panel comparing counts of synthetic records matching each attribute against the actual number retrieved from precomputed aggregates.
(e) Successive user selections progressively filter the records of the synthetic dataset, with real-time comparison to actual reportable values.
(f) Once the selection limit is exceeded, the user must either remove selections or continue filtering the synthetic data without comparison.
Overall workflow by role:
(1) The pipeline owner creates an interface template in Power BI Desktop (a), combining the visualizations and analytics required by target users.
(2) The data controller receives a data-bound template from the pipeline (b), modifies it as needed, then publishes it to the Power BI service.
(3) The interface user selects attribute values of interest based on synthetic counts (c), retrieving reportable aggregate counts in parallel (d,e,f).
On the question of whether the processing of deidentified data re-
quires additional consent from data subjects, Article 6(4) of the GDPR
requires the data controller to “ascertain whether processing for an-
other purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the personal
data are initially collected”. Considerations include the possible conse-
quences of the additional processing for data subjects and the existence
of “appropriate safeguards”. Pseudonymisation is given as an example
of such a safeguard, yet the replacement of personally-identifiable infor-
mation (PII) with pseudorandom strings offers only minimal protection.
Overall, legal privacy definitions based on what data controllers can
learn from data linking are distinct from technical notions of what an
attacker could theoretically learn from statistical disclosure.
Implementations of statistical disclosure control [11] began with
the replacement of exact statistics with point estimates whose variance
decreased with the number of independent samples. This idea later
developed into the multiple families of techniques including query
restriction (e.g., cell suppression), data perturbation (e.g., cell general-
ization or swapping), and output perturbation (e.g., rounding or random
noise injection) [2]. All approaches reviewed in this section use specific
implementations of these general techniques to control disclosure in
predictable ways. We later use this review to inform the design of
privacy protections for trafficking victims who consent to the sharing
of their deidentified case record for research purposes.
2.1 Syntactic anonymity for microdata release
Syntactic anonymity methods rely on “safety in numbers” – the idea
that the record for an individual cannot be identified within a crowd
of sufficiently similar records. The Datafly system [54] was an early
attempt to systematically control syntactic anonymity by suppressing,
substituting, and generalizing attribute values to reach a minimum count
of records in the equivalence class of records sharing those values. This
system also introduced the idea that data controllers could estimate the
likelihood of specific attributes being used to reidentify individuals by
linking to external data, and that higher expectations of linking should
lead to larger minimum equivalence class sizes.
These ideas were formalized by the definition of k-anonymity
[55, 56], which holds whenever the record for an individual cannot
be distinguished within an equivalnce class of at least k records sharing
equivalent quasi-identifiers – attributes that may be combined to rei-
dentify the individual based on external data or background knowledge.
Common quasi-identifiers include gender, date of birth, and zip code.
While k-anonymity is one of the most widely-used privacy tech-
niques, it remains vulnerable to a range of attacks. Homogeneity attacks
look for instances where an equivalence class of records sharing the
same quasi-identifiers also share the same sensitive attribute whose
disclosure would cause harm to the individual (e.g., political or sex-
ual orientation). `-diversity [34] guards against this threat of attribute
disclosure by enforcing diversity of sensitive attribute values within
each class, while t-closeness [32] protects further by ensuring that
the distribution of each sensitive attribute within an equivalence class
matches the distribution for the full dataset. Both also guard against
background knowledge attacks in which an attacker reidentifies an
individual’s record within an equivalence class because of a known sen-
sitive attribute value. However, no syntactic method can guard against
background knowledge attacks where a large number of sensitive at-
tributes are known to an attacker, and designating all such attributes as
quasi-identifiers can lead to unacceptably high data suppression [3].
2.2 Statistical anonymity for microdata release
Statistical anonymity methods look beyond the distribution of attribute
values in the “sample” of the dataset to include prior knowledge about
the broader population. k-map [57] generalizes k-anonymity such that
each tuple of quasi-identifiers in a microdata release correspond to at
least k entries in an external population identification database, thus
reducing the threat of identity disclosure (i.e., record-level reidentifi-
cation). Similarly, δ -presence [40] measures the more general threat
of membership disclosure in which harm is caused to an individual by
inferring their presence in a private dataset given a public dataset, and
presents algorithms for achieving a desired level of protection.
2.3 Differential privacy for statistical queries
A more general form of protection against membership disclosure is
provided through the concept of ε-differential privacy [16, 18], which
captures the increased risk to the privacy of an individual from partici-
pating in a database. The classical approach to achieving differential
privacy is to create a database query mechanism that injects calibrated
noise into query outputs to mask the impact of any single row. This
has been implemented in many ways, including the PINQ (Privacy
Integrated Queries) [36] extension to the LINQ query language and the
Flex [29] database interface supporting statistical SQL queries.
While classical approaches to differential privacy rely on a trusted
data controller with global access to the sensitive data, a related family
of local differential privacy algorithms support the sharing of pre-
randomized values with an untrusted data collector. These algorithms
build on the tradition of randomized response for sensitive survey
questions [66] and extend it with improved randomization mechanisms
[63] or support for new use cases (e.g., longitudinal telemetry and
reporting free-text values with RAPPOR [21]). Querying the data
involves aggregating the randomized responses and correcting for the
known bias of the randomization mechanism.
A benefit of differential privacy query mechanisms is that the privacy
loss associated with each query can be quantified mathematically. A
challenge is that these losses accumulate with successive queries, and
systems must stop answering queries once a predefined privacy budget
is reached. How to set, manage, and reset privacy budgets are complex
policy questions without any accepted standards. The PSI system [25]
is one system that attempts to help users understand the implication of
different privacy parameters and the allocation of privacy budgets across
multiple queries and users, but the core challenge of an exhaustable
privacy budget remains. Related work [23] also attempts to address
the serious statistical biases that can be introduced through differential
privacy mechanisms, which may otherwise lead to false inferences that
are detrimental to the subject population or society as a whole.
2.4 Synthetic anonymity for microdata release
An alternative approach to microdata release is to synthesize a new
dataset in which the records do not correspond to actual individuals, but
which preserve the structural and statistical properties of the original
data. Rubin first proposed the concept of synthetic microdata [48] as
a radical extension of the multiple imputation method used to fill in
missing data values based on conditional probability distributions. He
highlighted the guarantees that could be made to data subjects that
their data would never be shared directly, as well as the guarantees
to data analysts about the fidelity of the synthetic data, the ability to
use standard tools for its analysis, and the potential to submit analyses
prepared on synthetic data for private evaluation by the controllers of the
sensitive data. There are multiple examples of this idea in practice [47].
Recent work has applied modern machine learning methods to the
multiple imputation of synthetic data [33], systematically dropping
records from models trained to synthesize replacement records (cross
sampling) to ensure that the sensitive attributes of a synthetic record
have no dependence on the sensitive attributes of the original. The
approach builds two supervised classification models (e.g., Naive Bayes,
Decision Tree) to predict each attribute of a record: a progressive model
that predicts the sensitive value from the quasi-identifiers and prior
sensitive attributes of all other records, and a complementary model
that re-predicts the attribute from all other attributes of all other records.
While Rubin advocated against the release of synthetic records that
exist in the sensitive data, this approach reproduces sensitive rows with
a probability proportional to their frequency in the sensitive data.
2.5 Differential privacy for synthetic data release
Perturbation of microdata has also been shown to achieve differential
privacy if the perturbation mechanism can be represented as misclassi-
fication matrix that contains no zeros [52]. Differential privacy mech-
anisms can also be used to produce fully synthetic data for release,
including frequency tables using Beta-Binomial [7] or Poisson [46]
synthesizers, as well as contingency tables and OLAP cubes [4]. The
latter approach adds Laplace noise to the Fourier projection of the
source table before projecting back to create a synthetic table in the
integer domain. Any subsequent queries or operations on the synthetic
table do not access the raw data and thus do not cause additional pri-
vacy loss. PriView [45] uses the alternative approach of maximum
entropy optimization to support k-way marginal contingency tables for
d-dimensional datasets for cases where k > 3 and d is not small.
Several methods have also been proposed that construct a
differentially-private model of sensitive data and then sample from
that model to construct synthetic microdata for release. DPSynthe-
sizer [31] uses differentially private one-dimensional marginal distribu-
tions and gaussian copula functions to model attribute distributions and
their interdependence. PrivBAYES [68] works similarly but with low-
dimensional marginal distributions and Bayesian networks respectively.
This approach allocates the privacy budget to learning pairwise corre-
lations between attributes, but this does not scale to high-dimensional
data. Other work [8] proposed a sampling and thresholding mechanism
for learning such pairwise correlations without dividing the privacy
budget in proportion to
(n
2
)
. Under looser constraints, DPPro [67]
uses random projections that maintain probabilistic (ε,δ )-differential
privacy [17]. The same privacy guarantees have also been recently
demonstrated for synthetic data produced using deep learning in the
form of both auto-encoders [1] and generative adversarial networks [24],
representing a promising new approach that also apples to multimedia.
While the methods above are all capable of of controlling attribute
counts with differential privacy, and in many cases preserving the pair-
wise relationships between attributes, they do not control the production
of entire records whose combinations of attributes may be identifying.
The concept of plausible deniability [5] holds for synthetic data when-
ever there exists a set of sensitive records that could have generated the
same synthetic record with similar probability by which it was gener-
ated from its own sensitive seed record. Such seed-driven synthesis
can maintain both k-plausible deniability (where ≥ k sensitive records
could have been the seed for each synthesized record) and probabilistic
(ε,δ )-differential privacy. The resulting indistinguishability means that
an attacker cannot be certain whether a particular synthetic record was
in the original, sensitive dataset. However, when the sensitive data are
high-dimensional and sparse, either the level of plausible deniability or
data utility (because of the randomization necessary to maintain such
deniability) must decrease. To help maintain utility for differentially-
private data releases in general, the pMSE mechanism [53] has been
proposed as a way to guide the synthesis of microdata in a way that
maximizes the similarity of the synthetic and sensitive datasets based
on the ability of a classifier to differentiate them.
2.6 Privacy-preserving visual analytics
In addition to the many different approaches to data anonymization,
there is also a small body of published work on privacy-preserving vi-
sualization and visual analytics. Visual representations can themselves
preserve privacy based on the inherent ambiguity of spatial aggrega-
tions, for example in privacy-preserving parallel co-ordinates [13], scat-
terplots [14], and sankey diagrams [9] that apply k-anonymity [55, 56]
and `-diversity [34] to the geometry of clustered data points. Related
work presents a range of privacy and utility metrics for the evaluation of
such cluster-based representations [12]. A variety of approaches have
also been explored to create privacy-preserving heatmaps of location
trajectories, including privacy-preserving user count calculation and
kernel density estimation with and without a user diversity index [41].
A limitation of applying privacy-preserving methods at the visual-
ization layer is that such methods typically require access to the full
sensitive dataset. From a collaboration perspective, this is problem-
atic because some sensitive data may never be sharable without prior
application of anonymization, and any data shared without such pro-
tection remains vulnerable to security breaches and privacy leaks. An
alternative approach is therefore to create interfaces that allow users
to visually explore the trade-off between privacy and utility resulting
from different combinations of anonymization methods – an idea that
has been applied to both tabular data [65] and graph data [64].
3 WINNOW, CAST: ACCELERATOR AND LAUNCH EVENT
Tech Against Trafficking (TAT) is a coalition of technology companies
collaborating with global experts to help eradicate human trafficking
through the use of technology. Its member companies are Amazon,
AT&T, BT, Microsoft, and Salesforce, while its advisory group in-
cludes Babson Colleges Initiative on Human Trafficking and Modern
Slavery, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,
GSMA, IOM, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope (OSCE), techUK, University College London, UNSEEN, and the
World Business Council for Sustainable Development. Business for
Social Responibility (BSR) serves as the secretariat.
The flagship TAT intervention is a Accelerator program to advance
and scale the work of technology tools being used to combat human
trafficking. The inaugural Accelerator with CTDC began in July 2019
with a launch event structured as a two-day workshop, with partici-
pants representing TAT member companies, law enforcement agencies,
counter-trafficking organizations, and survivors of trafficking. Over the
course of the two days, participants formed teams and developed action
plans to tackle the key problems faced by CTDC. The three result-
ing workstreams tackled victim case management and data standards,
stakeholder engagement, and privacy-preserving data analytics.
4 DISCOVER: COUNTER-TRAFFICKING COLLABORATION
During the launch event, an activity-centered design process [19] was
used to structure and guide team discussions about the activity sys-
tem that our work aimed to transform. This process, grounded in
Engestro¨m’s system-oriented approach to Activity Theory [20], orga-
nizes concepts from the target activity and identifies the tensions that
characterize the structure and dynamics of that activity. As a seed
for our discussion, we began by analyzing two problem statements
prepared by CTDC before the event, picking out key concepts in italics:
Problem 1: How can CTDC data on identified victims of traf-
ficking be used to combat trafficking? CTDCs mission is to rapidly
develop the availability of data and evidence for counter trafficking
programs and to provide a mechanism for organizations to move data
to public and policy audiences. Through Tech Against Traffickings
Accelerator program, CTDC seeks to further develop its partnership
process and explore and better understand the ways in which data on
identified victims of trafficking can be used to combat human trafficking.
Problem 2: How can CTDC data on identified victims of traf-
ficking be shared effectively with concerned stakeholders? CTDCs
current ad-hoc solutions are often labor intensive or partner reliant and
there may be scope for improvement. Because of the sensitivity of the
data published, one key area of concern is anonymization. If publicly
available data is not correctly anonymized, others may be able to iden-
tify those involved. CTDC currently ensures that data is anonymized
through k-anonymization. However, the process to do so results in the
loss of much potentially useful and crucial data. Therefore, CTDC is
currently exploring other options to share more data and allow more
effective research to be done while still protecting privacy and civil
liberties. However, CTDC does not have expertise in implementing
differential privacy solutions and is worried about the costs.
4.1 Products
Products are the different types of outcome that motivate the activity. In
our case, the multiple products of activity were interrelated: combating
human trafficking by supporting effective research by publishing victim
of trafficking data while protecting privacy and civil liberties. These
products all need to be delivered through visualization since for many
stakeholders the underlying data would not otherwise be accessible.
The tension from the privacy literature of data privacy vs. analytic
utility succinctly captures the implied challenge of supporting effective
research to combat trafficking (high utility bar) by publishing data on
victims of trafficking (high privacy bar). This overarching tension is
reflected all across the activity system, and in general the goal is to
develop techniques that achieve high levels of both privacy and utility.
4.2 Personas
Personas are the different types of people using the tools of the ac-
tivity. IOM participants in the Accelerator program and launch event
represented the front-line analyst and gatekeeper personas respectively
that play a critical role in design study methodology [50]. While the
front-line analyst was responsible for all forms of data preparation and
publication – spanning microdata anonymization, dashboard construc-
tion, and data story production – the gatekeeper was IOM’s primary
contact and custodian for data on human trafficking and vulnerable
migrants, responsible for technical oversight and project management
as well as partnerships and stakeholder engagement. The key tension
here was ease of application vs. ease of justification for the privacy
mechanisms applied to case records and their impact on analytic utility.
Visual tools that can be evaluated interactively demonstrate ease of
application and are more easily justified than non-visual tools (e.g.,
algorithms presented independently of user experience).
4.3 Capabilities
Capabilities represent tool support for different types of task. The
problem statements highlighted anonymization as a crucial task for
developing the availability of data and evidence. The view of IOM
participants was that the current anonymization mechanism for release
of the CTDC Global Dataset (k-anonymization with k = 11 over the
quasi-identifiers of age, gender, and citizenship) resulted in a large loss
of utility from data suppression. This took the form of both algorithmic
suppression by the k-anonmyzation process, which removed 40% of the
total records, and elective suppression of many valuable data columns
that were conservatively judged as having potential for reidentification
when used in combinations that could not be fully anticipated.
A walk-through of the CTDC website also revealed visualization to
be an important channel for sharing evidence in the form of interactive
dashboads and data stories, created using a combination of embedded
interfaces developed in Microsoft Power BI, Google Maps, ArcGIS,
and DKAN. While these visualizations were built on top of the full
database of deidentified case records to create accurate reportable statis-
tics, they were labor-intensive to produce because of the ad-hoc way
in which analysts had to manually filter out rare (and thus potentially
disclosive) attributes. Because successive “drill-down” selections can
rapidly filter data down to very small subsets, these dashboards were
often constructed to allow filtering on just a single attribute rather than
allowing open-ended exploration. This negative impact on analytic util-
ity was also accompanied by an inconsistency in the statistics derived
from the k-anonymized CTDC Global Dataset download and online
reports (dashboards and data stories) based on the full victim database.
These include aggregate counts of individual attributes as well as pairs
of attributes representing meaningful relationships. Treating these re-
lationships as the edges of a graph, as in the CTDC visualization of
trafficking flows based on the countries of citizenship and exploitation
of victims, reveals important structural characteristics of the the traffick-
ing phenomenon. Data releases that misrepresent such structures can
mislead users who mistake them for the actual structures, potentially
leading to e.g., resources allocated to investigate false trafficking routes
implied by the data, or removed from routes that were underrepresented.
Overall, these challenges reflect a tension between releasing datasets
vs. releasing data reports. Both are necessary for different users and
use cases, and an ideal release mechanism would combine both in a
consistent way accessible through the visualization tools already in use.
4.4 Contexts
Contexts are the different types of contextual factor that shape the activ-
ity. The most salient factor in the target activity system is that IOM is
the data custodian for CTDC, responsible for integrating and publishing
data on behalf of the collaborative. The IOM is thus partner reliant,
dependent on the capacity of other data providers (e.g., NGOs working
directly with trafficking survivors) to make regular contributions to the
global dataset. Limited capacity to engage in legal data sharing agree-
ments with counter-trafficking programs and other potential data users
places the onus on IOM to collect, integrate, anonymize, and publish
updated data on a regular basis, with sufficient utility to support correct
data inferences and effective real-world interventions. We summarize
this tension as a provider driven vs. user driven release cadence. While
superior privacy could attract new data providers, superior utility could
similarly attract new users and use cases. Note that in both instances
it is not enough for privacy or utility to be technically superior – the
superiority must be understandable to all involved. Again, visualization
can play an important role in this communication process.
4.5 Roles
Roles are the different types of coordinated contribution to the activity.
Users of published data, dashboards, and evidence play a significant role
in the overall activity system. The problem statements called out public
and policy audiences, with surveys on the CTDC website indicating that
the main audience is academic researchers (62%), followed by NGOs
(11%), public sector practitioners (7%), and international organizations
(7%). At the launch event, representatives from law enforcement and
business supply chain management, as well as survivors of trafficking,
all advocated their roles as stakeholders in counter-trafficking data
collaboration. A tension in supporting the needs of all stakeholders is
their differing case orientation vs. problem orientation. Data providers
typically work directly with victims and the natural data format for
them is the individual case record. Such microdata is also the natural
input format for visualization tools used to construct aggregations and
distributions for analysis. The majority of data users are more interested
in the high-level trends and patterns that result, rather than the precise
contents of individual records (which are the source of privacy risks).
4.6 Rules
Rules are the different types of constraint on the performance of the
activity. In the case of publishing data on victims of trafficking, we
can reframe the rules that must be followed as the risks that must
be mitigated. The need to minimize (if not eliminate) these risks
succinctly captures the high-level design requirements for new tools:
(1) the privacy risk of data subjects being linked to a published record
or dataset; (2) the utility risk of data users making false inferences
and reports from data transformed to reduce privacy risk; and (3) the
accessibility risk of data stakeholders not being able to evaluate and
assent to how privacy and utility risks are controlled.
These risks also suggest their own tension as a guiding principle for
design: the need for technical guarantees vs. acceptable guarantees.
For example, while techniques based on differential privacy might be
able to offer strong mathematical guarantees about the level of privacy
loss, in practice such levels might be unacceptably high or lead to
unacceptable loss of analytic utility. Guarantees of privacy or utility
that are presented in overly technical terms may also be opaque to
stakeholders whose informed consent is crucial to the practical and
ethical sharing of data. Conversely, techniques like k-anonymization
may be acceptable despite their weaker technical guarantees because
they are easy to understand and apply while meeting legal definitions
of deidentified data. In the following section, we present new privacy-
preserving mechanisms designed to maximize such acceptability.
5 DESIGN: PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA PLATFORM
Our design challenge was to translate the various risks identified
through our discovery process into appropriate privacy-preserving
mechanisms informed by our literature review. Our corresponding
design process was highly iterative and experimental, applying new
and existing algorithms and analysis techniques to representative vic-
tim of trafficking data (the CTDC Global Dataset) and evaluating the
results with key stakeholders at IOM. Through this process, attribute
combinations emerged as critical concept for risk management:
• managing privacy risks by controlling the attribute combinations
that can appear in the records of a microdata release;
• managing utility risks by releasing reportable aggregate counts of
cases matching different attribute combinations (i.e., queries);
• managing accessibility risks by enabling interactive visual explo-
ration and evaluation of these complementary datasets.
5.1 Managing privacy risks with k-synthetic microdata
The first risk to privacy is traffickers operating according to the prosecu-
tor model, seeking to reidentify specific victims in the published dataset
based on distinguishing combinations of attributes. The trafficker must
first be able to link a combination of attributes to the victim using
background knowledge on their victims and how they were trafficked.
Second, they must believe that this combination is statistically rare
within the population of all victims. Third, this combination must be
unique (or rare) in the published dataset for the trafficker to confidently
link the victim to a specific record (or small set of records).
The risk of identity disclosure can be managed through the use of
synthetic data in which records no longer correspond to actual individ-
uals. However, this leaves the residual risk of membership disclosure if
traffickers identify records containing combinations of attributes that
are rare in the dataset, rare in the population, and linkable to known
victims. Even though a trafficker could not confidently identify a par-
ticular record as representing the victim, they could infer the likely
membership of that victim in the sensitive dataset if they believe that
the synthesis mechanism accurately reproduces actual attribute com-
binations. This would be a reasonable belief since published data
that misrepresents such combinations (e.g., links between countries of
citizenship and exploitation) would be highly detrimental to utility.
A direct solution is to adopt equivalence class constraints, similar
to k-anonymity, that control the combinations of attributes which may
appear in the records of published microdata. Such constraints can be
applied to the results of any data synthesis method, including those
offering differential privacy (e.g., [8, 67, 68]). In contrast with the prob-
abilistic guarantees of differential privacy, however, such constraints
on counts are concrete, easy to understand, and capable of masking
the presence of groups, not just individuals. In the context of human
trafficking case records, they are also easy to justify in terms of ad-
dressing the risk of traffickers inferring the presence of victims in the
sensitive dataset. This is not just a privacy risk, but a safety risk –
such beliefs may lead to retaliation against the victim for collaborating
with case workers and the implied likelihood of collaboration with law
enforcement. Such retaliation may be targeted directly at the victim or
indirectly at their close friends and family, and may lead to physical
and psychological harm in addition to the original crime.
We combine both of these concepts into the new notion of k-synthetic
microdata generated with the following guarantees:
• Utility guarantee: all short combinations of attributes (length
≤ s) appearing in the records of the synthetic dataset are frequent
(count ≥ ks) in the sensitive dataset – preserving relationships
between attributes and preventing unwanted implications about
the existence of rare or unobserved relationships.
• Privacy guarantee: no synthesized record contains any combina-
tions of attributes of length≤ ` that are rare in the sensitive dataset
(1≤ count < k`) and thus potentially disclosive – combinations
appear either zero or many times in the sensitive dataset in ways
that prevent membership disclosure. For rare attribute combina-
tions longer than `, privacy remains protected by their plausible
synthesis from shorter frequent combinations. The precise level
of such privacy leakage can be quantified empirically.
The parameters s, ks, `, and k` can be set according to the dimen-
sionality and sparsity of the sensitive data and the measured utility
and privacy leakage of data synthesized under these constraints. An
additional parameter kv may be used for independent control over how
many times an individual attribute must appear in the sensitive dataset
(count ≥ kv) before it may be reproduced in the synthetic dataset.
5.2 Managing utility risks with reportable aggregate data
Regardless of the technical utility of synthetic data, if users do not
have confidence in the accuracy of statistics derived from synthetic
data then they may not be willing to report them. Conversely, if users
derive and report inaccurate statistics from published synthetic data,
the broader audience of stakeholders within the data sharing ecosystem
may lose confidence in the data publisher. The risks of non-reporting
or misreporting of victim statistics are also significant in terms of the
potential impact on decisions made, resources allocated, and policies
developed to combat trafficking.
Major international reports on human trafficking typically report
only high-level statistics. For example, in the 2018 Global Trafficking
in Persons Report by the UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime) [61], statistics included number of detected victims by year
and region, share of detected victims by region of origin and detection,
shares of detected victims by age group, sex, and region, and forms of
exploitation by region. The CTDC website also offers visualizations
and data stories showing distributions of case attributes by region, indus-
try, sex, and age group. The implication is that publishing the aggregate
counts of cases matching small combinations of attributes alongside
any microdata release would support the complementary tasks of (1)
discovering high-level statistics for reporting and (2) examining the
low-level structure of case records for more detailed analysis.
Although the greatest utility is achieved through the publication of
precise aggregate counts, the publication of small counts or small dif-
ferences in counts between successive releases can both be disclosive.
The use of a minimum reporting threshold can address the risks associ-
ated with small counts, while the use of a fixed rounding precision can
enforce minimum differences between counts published over time.
Our notion of reportable aggregate data describes the publication of
aggregate counts for the short combinations of attributes (1≤ length≤
r) typically reported in the literature on trafficking, where these counts
have been subjected to a minimum threshold t and rounding precision
p as a privacy-preserving mechanism. While high-utility synthetic
data should accurately approximate these counts, the publication of
reportable aggregate data alongside k-synthetic microdata removes any
uncertainty associated with the use of synthetic data.
5.3 Managing accessibility risks with visual analytics
The need for privacy-preserving visual analytics interfaces was sug-
gested both by the existing use of visualizations on the CTDC website
and our proposed publication of two complementary datasets in need
of interactive, user-directed comparison. Mainstream Business Intel-
ligence (BI) platforms like Power BI and Tableau offer the potential
for exploratory data analysis – analysis that is not driven by prior be-
liefs, but by the desire to discover meaningful structure in the data [60].
Such exploratory data analysis is often facilitated through the use of vi-
sual analytics interfaces that follow Shneiderman’s information seeking
mantra of “overview first, zoom and filter, then details on demand” [51].
For synthetic microdata, dashboard interfaces can be constructed
that show the distribution of values for each data attribute using “slicer”
visuals that are mutually filtering. As in Figure 1, for example, the
interface might show an overview that juxtaposes visuals for each
attribute of the k-synthetic microdata, with each visual showing the
distribution of that attribute by listing its values from most to least
frequent. The user can then zoom and filter by selecting attribute
values, with the effect of filtering the underlying dataset to include only
records containing the selected attributes. Multiple selections construct
a compound filter that shows both the distributions of related attributes
and the possible ways to extend the filter combination – offering an
“information scent” [43] that guides exploration. However, whereas
conventional visual analytics is grounded in real records whose details
on demand may lead to insights, this is not the case for synthetic
microdata representing “statistical individuals” and not actual people.
What is of interest during exploratory analysis of synthetic microdata
is how the “estimated” counts formed by filtering and aggregating
synthetic records compare to the “actual” counts that would have been
seen had the original sensitive dataset been used. A complementary
dataset of reportable aggregates could fulfil this purpose, with actual
counts being shown alongside synthetic counts whenever they have
been precomputed for the current combination of filtering attributes.
By precomputing the remaining counts of all attributes after filtering by
attribute combinations of length < r, r−1 becomes a selection limit of
how many concurrent selections the user may make while retaining the
ability to see estimated and actual counts juxtaposed for comparison.
Any selections up to this limit will dynamically retrieve reportable
values from the aggregate data, while selections made beyond this
limit will allow further exploration of the synthetic microdata only.
Unlike the privacy budget for queries under differential privacy, this
limit is reusable and does not in itself represent a privacy-preserving
mechanism (since the thresholding and rounding of aggregate counts
could theoretically protect all lengths of attribute combinations). Rather,
it reflects practical constraints on what needs to be precomputed for the
purposes of high-level reporting and synthetic data evaluation.
In a field that has dedicated most visualization efforts towards the
needs of data controllers, e,g,, understanding the implications of privacy
budget allocation in PSI [25] and DataSynthesizer [27,42], our approach
to parallel exploration of complementary privacy-preserving datasets is
distinct in its focus on increasing accessibility for diverse data users.
6 IMPLEMENT: PIPELINED SYNTHESIS OF DATA, REPORTS
In this section, we describe our implementation of an integrated pipeline
that transforms a sensitive data table (as a CSV file) into several privacy-
preserving data artifacts. These include a corresponding table of syn-
thetic data and the auxiliary data tables needed to drive a generic
interface template built as a Microsoft Power BI [37] report. There are
many advantages of developing privacy-preserving interfaces within an
established visual analytics tool, including familiarity, flexibility, and
reliability. Howerver, such tools typically assume the availability of
individual-level microdata, which is precisely what cannot be shared
(in this case and many others) for privacy reasons. Our implementation
overcomes this challenge by supporting visual exploration of synthetic
data ‘corrected’ in real-time by precomputed aggregate data.
6.1 Creating the Power BI interface template
Our pipeline needs to accommodate the generation of visual analytics
interfaces for any valid input data, allowing for variability in the number
of input columns, the mappings from input columns to output visuals,
and the groupings of visuals into pages used to answer different analytic
questions. To support this flexibility, we developed a generic, single-
page interface template within a Power BI Desktop report (Figure 1a)
that we could manipulate programmatically based on input data and
configuration parameters. The template page comprised a page title, a
grid of Attribute Slicer [38] visuals prepared to rank attribute values
by the count of corresponding records, a combined list of all attribute
values comparing “Estimated” counts (from dynamic aggregation of
the k-synthetic microdata table) against “Actual” counts (from dynamic
lookups into the reportable aggregate data table), a “Compare” slicer
for comparing these counts within selected attributes of interest, and the
number of “Selections Remaining”. Estimated, Actual, and Selections
Remaining are all implemented as Data Analysis Expressions (DAX)
measures [39] generated by our pipeline to match the columns of the
k-synthetic microdata that needs to be visualized. By default, null
values are hidden using visual-level filters.
6.2 Customizing the Power BI interface template
The selection model of Power BI constructs filters as the union of
selections within visuals and the intersection of selections across visu-
als. This is difficult to express in lay terms and is a potential source
of confusion for novice users. It is therefore simpler to allow only
single selections within each Attribute Slicer visual and instruct users
that “numbers represent the counts of cases with that attribute and all
selected attributes”. This restriction also reduces the overhead of com-
puting and storing reportable aggregates and generally allows a higher
selection limit to be specified. It also introduces a design trade-off for
compound attributes (e.g., means of control) that may take multiple
values per record: a single visual can combine all attribute values in a
compact way, or multiple visuals can each communicate one value in a
way that allows selections to query the intersections of these values or
their complements (zero/false). The former reserves more visual space
for other attributes, while the latter allows more in-depth analysis of
that one attribute. Since both approaches may be necessary for different
analytic questions, our pipeline allows the user to specify a list of titled
pages comprising lists of visuals, with each visual bound to either a
single column (e.g., MeansOfControl:DebtBondage or MeansOfCon-
trol:PhysicalAbuse) or all binary columns sharing a common prefix
(e.g., MeansOfControl). Our pipeline programmatically arranges a grid
of Attribute Slicer visuals based on the number of visuals specified.
The default behavior of the pipeline is to group columns by prefix and
bind each of the 8 visuals to the first 8 column groups. Within Power
BI Desktop, the user can then duplicate pages and rebind visuals as
desired to create the final interface. This can be shared directly as a
Power BI PBIX file or published to the Power BI service for web-based
access (either within an organization or via a public webpage).
6.3 Configuring the pipeline
Our pipeline is written in Python and configured using parameters
controlling the generation of k-synthetic microdata (s, ks, `, k`, kv)
and reportable aggregate data (r, t, p) (see Section 5), as well as
the construction of decision tree classifiers used for synthesis. Such
classifiers are capable of capturing complex non-linear relationships
between attributes in a way that is fast to apply and easy to interpret.
Input data takes the wide format of one row per individual, with
multiple categorical attribute columns per row/record. Single columns
are used to represent single-valued attributes (e.g., year of registration),
while multi-valued attributes (e.g., type of trafficking) are represented
by multiple binary columns. Continuous numeric attributes (e.g, age)
must first be quantized into discrete categories (e.g, age bands) based
on the desired level of granularity for reporting and the need to maintain
sufficient counts for each category/combination to allow reproduction.
By default, our approach to controlling the release of attribute com-
binations applies only to positive positive values, i.e., not zero, false,
null, or other user-specified negative value (e.g., fictional country code
ZZ). For each data column, additional pipeline parameters specify the
applicable negative values and whether these should also be controlled
because they are identifying or sensitive. Any negative values marked
as such are incorporated into our analysis of attribute combinations.
6.4 Generating k-synthetic microdata
Our approach uses machine learning to model and predict data attributes
in a manner inspired by previous approaches [33, 68]. However, since
we plan to protect the reproduction of attribute combinations according
to k-synthetic data constraints, we are free to model each attribute in
its entirety (rather than through cross-sampling or differential privacy
probes) and to use the sensitive data (rather than an empty table) as a
starting point for synthesis. We use the following process:
1. Extract synthetic data constraints. From the sensitive data table,
extract all short common attribute combinations (with lengths ≤ s and
counts ≥ ks) that must form the building blocks of synthetic records
and all longer rare attribute combinations (with lengths ≤ ` and counts
< k`) that must not be reproduced in synthetic records.
2. Prepare synthetic data table. Create the initial synthetic data
table as a copy of the sensitive data table. Suppress all attribute values
occurring < kv times in a column by replacing with a null value.
3. Prioritize column prediction order. For each column, build a
decision tree classifier to predict that column from all other columns and
sum the probability mass of the most probable classes. This represents
the ‘viscosity’ of the column, or resistance to change through random
resampling. Sort columns for resampling in decreasing viscosity order
to encourage more variation in more naturally variable columns.
4. Resample columns. For each column in order, build a decision tree
classifier to predict that column from all other columns in the evolving
synthetic data table and use it to resample that column in place.
5. Suppress invalid combinations. Sort columns for suppression in
increasing viscosity order. For each column, extract all combinations
of attributes (length ≤ `) of all columns up to and including the current
column. If any of these is a rare combination or a short non-common
combination, for each row containing that combination, suppress one
attribute of the combination at random with probabilities weighted by
column viscosities. This has the effect of focusing suppression on the
least variable (i.e., more potentially identifying) columns.
6. Output k-synthetic microdata file. Return synthetic data columns
to their original order, shuffle rows, and output to a CSV file.
Fig. 2. Analysis of sensitive data. Shows combination counts and the
percentage of rare combinations by combination length. As combination
length increases, so too does the percentage of rare combinations that
may be used to identify victims (and must therefore be suppressed).
6.5 Generating reportable aggregate data
Our synthesis pipeline precomputes the counts of all attribute combina-
tions with lengths ≤ r (r ≤ `), with the precise actual counts protected
through the use of a reporting threshold t and precision p. The resulting
data are released as a CSV file in the format [selections, value,
protected count], alongside an additional data table listing all at-
tribute values. When used in Power BI with appropriate DAX measures,
these tables allow dynamic retrieval of ‘Actual’ counts for the current
selections that may be safely reported as accurate to the closest p.
6.6 Evaluating utility and privacy
The pipeline publishes summary CSV files describing the sensitive
and synthetic datasets by combination length and post-filtering record
counts. For combination lengths, statistics include the frequency of
combinations in each dataset, the error between them (mean absolute
difference), the percentage of rare combinations in the sensitive dataset,
and the percentage of combinations in the synthetic dataset that are
rare in the sensitive dataset (i.e., the privacy leakage from uncontrolled
attribute combinations of length > `). The pipeline also automatically
produces a range of charts illustrating these statistics (e.g., Figures 2, 3,
4, 5, and 6), as well as reports on the distinct and total attribute values
suppressed under the kv constraint and the number of sensitive values
that were resampled to different values during the synthesis process.
7 DEPLOY: APPLICATION TO THE CTDC GLOBAL DATASET
We now analyze an example run of our pipeline on a version of the
CTDC global dataset with 55,434 rows and 33 columns (1.8 million
cells), using synthesis parameters s= 3, ks = 10, `= 5, k`= 10, kv = 50
and reportable aggregate parameters r = 6, t = 10, p = 10.
Reportable aggregates analysis. Our pipeline yielded 3,594,590 non-
zero values supporting all possible combinations of ≤ 5 user selections
(from r = 6), resulting in a large but manageable CSV file (460MB).
Attribute prefiltering analysis. Our inclusion threshold for individual
attribute values (kv = 50) was intended to protect countries with low
counts of citizenship or exploitation. The filtering report confirmed
suppression of 14 countries of citizenship (30%) across 333 records
(0.6%) and 17 of exploitation (30%) across 450 records (0.8%).
Sensitive combination analysis. Figure 2 shows the frequencies of
sensitive attribute combinations by length following the prefiltering
process. Among a total of 201,921,352 sensitive combinations overall,
frequencies peak at 34,444,656 sensitive combinations of length 9.
Rare combination analysis. Figure 2 also shows that as the lengths
of sensitive combinations increase, so too does the percentage of rare
combinations (‘rare’ defined as < 10 per k-anonymity conventions) –
up to a maximum of 100% for an average of 19.4% rare combinations.
Synthetic combination analysis. Figure 3 shows the corresponding
frequencies of synthetic attribute combinations by length, peaking at
18,646,862 combinations of length 9 among a total of 111,310,876 syn-
thetic combinations overall. Note that while the shape of the distribution
mirrors that of the sensitive dataset, the total number of combinations
is almost halved as a result of the constrained synthesis process.
Fig. 3. Analysis of synthetic data. Shows combination counts and the
percentage leaking rare sensitive combinations by length. As length
increases, the percentage of combinations leaked from the sensitive
dataset peaks at 1.9% (for length 15) and then falls back to zero.
Privacy analysis. Privacy leakage occurs when rare attribute com-
binations from the sensitive dataset are reproduced in the records of
the synthetic dataset. Figure 3 plots such leakage for each length of
synthetic combination, rising from 0% for the combination lengths
controlled by our k-synthetic constraints (lengths ≤ `= 5) to a max of
1.9% for combinations of length 15, giving an overall privacy leakage
across all synthetic combinations of 0.36%. This means that even if
a trafficker can link a victim to a combination of attributes contained
within a synthetic data record and believes that this combination is rare
in the real world, there is only a 0.36% chance on average (and 1.9%
chance in the worst case) that this combination was rare in the sensitive
dataset and thus potentially disclosive of the victim’s membership.
Figure 5 illustrates the operation of the k-synthetic constraints that
control privacy leakage – no synthetic attribute combinations with
length ` (`= 5) occurred < k` times (k` = 10) in the sensitive dataset.
Figure 6 shows the cumulative impact of constraining shorter attribute
combinations once we stop enforcing that constraint for longer combi-
nations (for length 6 when `= 5) – although rare combinations are not
eliminated, they are dramatically reduced (also shown in Figure 3).
Utility analysis. Figure 4 shows how increasing numbers of selec-
tions (i.e., longer combinations) result in smaller counts of synthetic
records, on average, with mean absolute error increasing as record
counts decrease before dropping again for very small record counts
of 25 or less. The error behavior is qualitatively similar to the effects
of noise injection under differential privacy, in that as the value of
the reported statistic decreases, the percentage error tends to increase.
From a mean error of 4.0% for individual attribute counts, progressive
user selections rapidly drill down to small sets of records, resulting in
a mean count of 29.4 filtered records and a mean error of 5.0 records.
These low levels of both error and leakage were also obtained through
a data synthesis process that resampled only 93,659 sensitive data cells
to new values and suppressed 11,723 more, for a total difference of
only 105,382 cells between then two datasets (5.8%). In other words,
the vast majority (94.2%) of the sensitive data is preserved.
Fig. 4. Analysis of synthetic data utility. Shows the average combination
length and percentage absolute error for user selections resulting in
different counts of synthetic records. Counts are binned for analysis
using exponentially increasing bin sizes and bins are labelled with their
upper limit. The maximum error of 38% is reached for counts of 26–50.
Fig. 5. Counts of attribute combinations of length 5 when ` = 5 and
k` = 10 (i.e., k-synthetic constraints are active). All combinations with
sensitive counts < k` are suppressed (synthetic count 0).
Fig. 6. Counts of attribute combinations of length 6 when ` = 5 and
k` = 10 (i.e., k-synthetic constraints are inactive). Most combinations with
sensitive counts < k` are suppressed (synthetic counts close to 0).
8 REFLECT: TRAFFICKING AND TECHNOLOGY
We now conclude with reflections in terms of both trafficking and
technology, describing limitations, implications, and future directions.
8.1 Trafficking
Our target with this work is the millions of trafficking victims around
the world, the survivors of trafficking, and all the people who might
avoid being trafficked through data-driven collaboration within the
counter-trafficking community. While we are confident that the so-
lution presented in this paper achieves all of its privacy, utility, and
accessibility goals on the k-anonymized, 55,434 record version of the
CTDC Global Dataset, we have not yet tested the solution on the
full deidentified (non-public) case records with many additional data
columns. Doing this with consent from all CTDC data contributors
represents the next major step for the work. A corresponding caution
is that any counts of trafficking cases implied by our work relate to
the k-anonymous version of the CTDC Global Dataset, not the full
victim database. Because of the potential for sampling and survivorship
bias, even these counts may not accurately represent the full nature and
extent of trafficking actually taking place.
Real-world deployment of our pipeline and publishing of related
data artifacts on the CTDC platform will require critical review, feed-
back, and consensus from diverse stakeholders at IOM and its CTDC
partners, as well as from TAT and its member companies. This pro-
cess has already started, with the early-stage technology successfully
demonstrated to representatives of the counter-trafficking community
at a Tech Against Trafficking showcase event in February 2020 [58].
While initial feedback is encouraging, it will take time to establish
independent use of the pipeline by IOM and to find the right ways to
communicate the approach to public visitors of the CTDC website.
Despite the challenges of transforming an existing data platform in
a sensitive domain, the opportunities are significant. Our generation of
k-synthetic microdata automatically prevents the publication of records
whose attribute combinations may be used to infer the presence of
victims, allowing many more attributes of victim case records to be
shared for analysis. Such extra detail could be crucial to understanding
aspects of trafficking (such as the nature of border crossings) that
are not currently shared due to possible privacy risks. Our proposed
publication of reportable aggregates alongside k-synthetic microdata
also aims to ensure that no approach to microdata release, k-synthetic
or otherwise, can override the need for accurate reporting of statistics
on which so many budgets, policies, and human lives depend.
8.2 Technology
There are many domains beyond human trafficking where sensitive data
needs to be shared in a way that is both privacy preserving to people rep-
resented in the data and accessible to people seeking insights from the
data. While many stakeholders will typically lack the technical skills
to work with data programmatically, the use of interactive visualization
makes it possible for a wide audience to access and analyze data in
ways that may have otherwise been impossible. Another design choice
we made with accessibility in mind was to support privacy-preserving
visual analytics within the context of a mainstream tool (Power BI),
rather than as a custom application. Not only may end users be familiar
with such tools, their use allows pipeline users to take advantage of
existing visualization libraries and dashboard hosting services when
customizing and sharing interfaces for end users. An additional advan-
tage conferred by our use of mainstream tools is that it forced a design
solution based on privacy-preserving data files that may themselves be
freely distributed, rather than relying on server-side access to sensitive
datasets that are vulnerable to security breaches. This also enables use
cases supported by microdata that would not otherwise be unavailable,
such as building machine learning models over sensitive datasets.
Our use of complementary datasets derived but also decoupled from
a source dataset posed a significant design challenge in terms of how
end-users could explore these datasets in parallel. In our solution, we
used synthetic microdata to drive standard visualizations that assume
microdata as input. Through the combined use of DAX measures and
precomputed aggregate data, we enabled the interactive selection of
filters from synthetic data distributions to retrieve the corresponding
sensitive data distributions in real-time. This allows users to interact
with the synthetic data as if it were the the sensitive data, and moreover,
obtain the same results (up to the predetermined selection limit and
rounding precision). The repeated juxtaposition of actual and estimated
counts also allows users to evaluate the quality of the synthetic data in
specific areas of interest (e.g., for a particular country) that may vary
between users, and help establish appropriate levels of confidence in
estimates obtained after the selection limit has been exceeded. Future
work may explore (a) how actual aggregates may be used to ‘correct’
the representation of synthetic data within visuals themselves, (b) how
such visuals may gracefully degrade to synthetic counts and binned-
count confidence intervals once the selection limit is exceeded, (c) how
to automate the selection of pipeline parameters for a given dataset, (d)
how to combine differential privacy and k-synthetic data constraints,
and (e) how to extend to log and graph data, all of which are promising
research directions beyond the scope of this initial design study.
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